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*
In addition to transferring about 16 percent of GDP from exporters to importers,
Uzbekistan’s quasi-fiscal multiple exchange rate regime generates identifiable
welfare losses of 2–8 percent of GDP on import markets and up to 15 percent on
export markets. These excess burdens have increased substantially with the
growing difference among exchange rates. The welfare analysis allows some
conclusions regarding the optimal reform strategy: (i) welfare losses will decline
overproportionally as exchange rates unify, (ii) exchange rate unification should
be supplemented by changing the explicit fiscal system; (iii) at a minimum,
Uzbekistan would benefit from moving to an explicit fiscal regime. [JEL F31, H29]
I
n January 1997, Uzbekistan formally (re)introduced a system of multiple
exchange rates and restrictions on current account transactions with the aim of
promoting import substituting industries, protecting foreign exchange reserves,
and subsidizing basic food imports. Several recent studies have dealt with the
effects of this system on sectoral distribution, foreign investment, and macroeco-
nomic stability.1 However, its consequences for economic efficiency and welfare,
while acknowledged, have so far received little attention. This paper, which builds
on an earlier article by Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard (1999), tries to address
this question. Specifically, it attempts to identify and quantify the substantial
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tence of at least three distinct exchange rates in Uzbekistan. This analysis also
shows how a simple exercise in welfare economics can provide insights into the
appropriate sequencing of reforms. The approach presented here may thus serve
as a blueprint for structural policies aiming at the removal of distortions in
general.
I. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Exchange Regime Since 1996
Uzbekistan is one of only a few transition countries2 that operates a segmented
foreign exchange market and multiple exchange rates, in connection with strict
controls of export and import markets. After a period of foreign exchange and
trade liberalization in 1995–96, this system was first created as an emergency
measure in response to growing balance of payment pressures following an unex-
pected deterioration of the country’s terms-of-trade position. Since then, the
authorities have justified the continued—and intensified—use of current account
restrictions with a need to direct resources from traditional exports (such as
cotton, gold, minerals) to the development of a capital-intensive, import-substi-
tuting industrial base (for example, automobiles, energy, chemistry) and to subsi-
dize socially important consumer good imports. The foreign exchange regime has
thus become the cornerstone of the so-called “Uzbek model of development,”
which emphasizes a dominant role of the state during the transition process. More
fundamentally, this system emerged in response to a general lack of market
reforms, especially in the fiscal sphere.
In practice, Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange market is split into three
segments:3 two official and one unofficial. In 1997, the largest segment was the
so-called auction market at the Uzbek Republican Currency Exchange (URCE).
In this market, the government determines administratively an appreciated
exchange rate, well below the market clearing level. Since at this rate, demand for
foreign exchange exceeds supply, the government has to restrict access and
enforce supply. The supply of foreign exchange to the URCE mainly derives from
the mandatory surrender of all foreign exchange proceeds from “centralized
exports,” in particular gold and cotton fiber, which make up about two-thirds of
the country’s total export earnings. On the demand side, the Republican Monetary
Commission (RMC) decides who may buy foreign exchange at the URCE and
how much. Access to the auction market rate is granted to certain importers of
capital goods, raw materials, grains, and some high-priority consumer goods, as
well as enterprises servicing foreign loans guaranteed by the government.
Requests for foreign exchange have to be submitted by selected banks on behalf
of their clients. The government itself also acquires foreign exchange at the
URCE, mainly in order to service its own external debt. Starting in mid-1998,
2Among the countries of the Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union, only
Turkmenistan applies foreign exchange regimes similar to that of Uzbekistan. 
3Strictly speaking, the description of the foreign exchange regime covers only the period from
January 1998 to June 2000. On July 1, 2000, and July 1, 2001, the authorities introduced a number of
measures that further segmented the foreign exchange market. These changes are not covered by this
paper. They do not, however, alter the substance of the analysis. access to this market became somewhat more restricted (at least by law).
Commercial banks were generally granted access to the URCE at the more depre-
ciated commercial bank exchange rate (see below) with the profit from the
exchange rate difference accruing to the central bank.
The second official segment of Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange market is the
commercial bank market, where commercial banks and exchange bureaus trade
foreign exchange with other banks, enterprises, and individuals. Formally, the
commercial exchange rate is freely determined, but in practice, it is administra-
tively set by the government below the market clearing level. Until mid-1998, this
rate was not allowed to deviate by more than 12 percent from the auction market
exchange rate, but following a decree of July 1, 1998,4 this margin has been
adjusted upward.
In response to excess demand at this appreciated rate, the government also
restricts access and enforces supply in this market. On the supply side, exporters
in 1997 and 1998 had to surrender 30 percent of all foreign exchange proceeds
from decentralized (that is, non-gold and non-cotton fiber) exports. Effective
January 1, 1999, the surrender requirement was increased to 50 percent. The
mandatory surrender had to be at the more appreciated auction rate until July 1,
1998 but is now at the commercial bank rate. In this connection, the buy/sell
spread for commercial banks has been reduced to about 3 percent from 12 percent.
In addition, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) sells foreign exchange to
commercial banks from the 100 percent surrender for centralized exports; in doing
so, the CBU benefits from the growing spread between the auction rate and the
commercial bank rate (see Box 1). On the demand side, only a limited number of
traders are permitted to buy foreign exchange at the commercial bank market, and
they need to obtain a special license and a foreign exchange quota from the RMC.
Individuals are only allowed to purchase small amounts of foreign exchange for a
very limited number of purposes, such as pilgrimages or authorized study abroad.
An inevitable consequence of these strict regulations of official markets for
foreign exchange is the emergence of an unofficial (illegal) curb market for
foreign exchange. The exchange rate on this market is largely determined by the
demand that cannot be satisfied on the two official markets. Therefore, the curb
market premiums reflect, inter alia, the extent to which access to the official
markets is restricted. The mark-up for foreign exchange on the domestic curb
market was about 100 percent until mid-1998, but has since increased to more than
400 percent (see Figure 1).
In addition, there is a non-cash offshore curb market where the exchange rate
is up to 50 percent more depreciated than at the domestic curb market, due to the
existence of cash withdrawal restrictions in Uzbekistan’s banking system. The size
of this market, however, is unknown, and it is less observable than the other three.
For the sake of simplicity, this market segment is excluded from the remaining
analysis.
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Box 1. Quasi-Fiscal Operations Through the Central Bank
The decree of July 1, 1998 opened a new source of profit for the CBU, as it was now allowed to
buy foreign exchange at the auction rate and sell it at the more depreciated commercial banks’
exchange rate. In conventional accounting terms, this profit is recorded in the capital accounts of
the CBU’s balance sheet. These are augmented every time the CBU sells foreign exchange to a
licensed importer or a commercial bank. Ceteris paribus, these foreign exchange operations have
reduced the growth of reserve money as the CBU withdrew money from the economy by
implicitly taxing exporters. They, therefore, acted as an automatic stabilizer within a rather loose
monetary policy.
This accounting profit1 only partly reflects the quasi-fiscal operation incurred by a central
bank in a situation with a parallel market-determined exchange rate. In economic terms, the
central bank makes an implicit profit or loss every time it buys or sells foreign exchange at the
artificially appreciated exchange rate (see, for example, Agénor and Ucer, 1995, pp. 26–27). This
is because the true market clearing exchange rate more accurately reflects the true marginal value
of foreign exchange than the overvalued official exchange rates. Thus, there is an implicit tax
(subsidy) associated with the central bank’s foreign exchange operations if it is a net buyer
(seller) of foreign exchange. This holds even in a situation where the central bank sells foreign
exchange at the same rate as it buys it.
The table below summarizes the CBU’s quasi-fiscal operations due to the existence of
multiple exchange rates, including buying and selling foreign exchange at below market rates. To
do this, one needs to estimate the true market exchange rate, and here we choose a weighted
average of the existing exchange rates using the relative share of the three market segments.
1997 1998 1999
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
CBU inflows 894 1,292 938 1,125 729 784
Gold production 392 359 341 339 323 337
Centralized exports (mainly cotton) 502 933 596 786 406 446
CBU outflows 1,441 1,501 1,095 982 984 576
CBU direct sales for 
priority purposes 1,441 1,501 1,095 502 503 402
CBU sales to commercial banks 0 0 0 480 481 174
(In millions of sum, unless otherwise indicated)
Balance of implicit taxes (+) 
and subsidies (–) –11,934 –4,908 –4,817 14,293 –19,558 46,616
(as a percentage of GDP) –3.8 –0.8 –1.0 1.5 –2.7 3.4
Because of different legal 
exchange rates 0 0 0 6,941 11,481 7,995
Because of buying/selling below 
estimated market clearing 
exchange rate –11,934 –4,908 –4,817 7,352 –31,039 38,621
Memorandum item:
Estimated market clearing exchange 
rate (average, sum per U.S. dollars) 80 98 116 156 237 320
Source: CBU; and authors’ own calculations.
1The accounting profit can be calculated as the difference between the two exchange rates
multiplied by the amount of foreign exchange sold. See Mackenzie and Stella (1996), pp. 20–21.Figure 2 shows foreign exchange flows in Uzbekistan’s two official markets
in the three years following the introduction of convertibility restrictions in late
1996. Total inflows declined because low commodity prices (especially for gold
and cotton) in combination with the overvalued official exchange rate, convert-
ibility restrictions, and a general deterioration of the business climate led to a
decline in exports and foreign direct investment, as well as an increase in unof-
ficial capital outflows. As one can see from Figure 2, the government reacted to
this trend by curtailing currency conversions for imports and by drawing down
foreign assets. In addition, there were substantial unrecorded foreign exchange
transactions on the illegal curb market. One estimate by the World Bank (1999,
p. 113) puts purchases on this market segment in 1997 at some US$1.4 billion
or 26 percent of all foreign exchange sales, excluding capital account transac-
tions (Table 1).5
The shares of the three market segments have shifted markedly since 1996.
Following the essence of the decree in July 1998, some foreign exchange
purchases were moved from the auction market (at the official exchange rate) to
the commercial bank market (at the commercial bank exchange rate). The curb



























Figure 1. Uzbekistan: Exchange Rates, April 30, 1996–January 1, 2000
(In sum/US$)
Sources: CBU, IMF, staff estimates.
5Sales of foreign exchange may in fact be higher, as households and enterprises build up cash foreign
exchange assets. Persistently high inflation rates, restrictions in the banking system, and negative real















Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1, 1999 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1, 1998 Q4 Q3 Q2, 1997
Centralized exports (mainly cotton)
Gold production









Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1, 1999 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1, 1998 Q4 Q3 Q2, 1997
Commercial banks’ sales
CBU direct sales for priority purposes










Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1, 1999 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1, 1998 Q4 Q3 Q2, 1997
Net flows (left scale)









Figure 2. Foreign Exchange Flows through the Banking System
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Sources: CBU, authors’ own calculations.market probably gained importance as tightened convertibility restrictions led
more and more importers to purchase foreign exchange illegally.6
II. Quasi-Fiscal Operations Through 
the Foreign Exchange Regime
Governments can collect revenues and redistribute income among sectors and
household groups by means other than explicit taxes and subsidies. Such activities
are usually referred to as quasi-fiscal operations because they are fiscal in all but
name although they are often carried out by central banks and other public finan-
cial institutions.7 The Uzbek authorities use a wide range of such mechanisms,
including multiple currency practices, inflation tax, subsidized and directed
lending, non-remunerated reserve requirements and credit ceilings, price interven-
tions in product markets, and wage regulation. Of these, the multiple currency
regime is probably the most significant—although it is in the nature of quasi-fiscal
operations that they cannot be easily quantified. According to one study (IMF,
1998, pp. 58–68), the array of implicit taxes and subsidies related to multiple
currency practices amounted to almost 13 percent of GDP in 1997, if one assumes
a hypothetical market clearing rate for that year of sum 100 per U.S. dollar. As will
be shown below, the size of these government activities increased in the years
1998–99, as the difference between the official exchange rates and the true market
clearing rate widened. In addition, the changes introduced in July 1998 made the
system more complex with regard to the CBU’s quasi-fiscal operations (see Box 1).
Christoph B.Rosenberg and Maarten de Zeeuw
166
6Since no estimates of the size of the curb market in 1998 and 1999 are available, it is assumed to
have increased slightly to 35 percent of all transactions. Note, however, that this assumption influences
the calculation of the indicative exchange rate, the U.S. dollar denominated GDP, and ultimately the size
of the welfare effects described below.
7For a survey of quasi-fiscal operations in general, see Mackenzie and Stella (1996).
Table 1. Uzbekistan: Average Exchange Rates 
and Market Shares, 1997–99
(In sums per U.S. dollar)
Average Exchange Rates Estimated Market Share
Auction Auction
market Commercial Curb market Commercial Curb
(CBU) bank market market1 (CBU) bank market market
(In percent)
1997 67 75 150 (124%) 55 19 26
1998 95 105 270 (184%) 39 31 30
1999 125 163 540 (334%) 26 39 35
Sources: CBU; World Bank (1999), p. 113; and authors’own calculations.
1Curb market premium in parentheses.In this paper, we concentrate on the immediate impact of multiple exchange
rates on legal export and import markets alone, that is, we abstract from their side
effects on illegal trade, households, banks, and the budget. These are partly dealt
with in IMF (1998, pp. 58–68) and World Bank (1999, pp. 17–24).
The quasi-fiscal impact of Uzbekistan’s multiple exchange rate regime on
exporters and importers arises from the difference between the administratively set
official exchange rate and the true market clearing exchange rate (that is, the rate
that would emerge in the absence of all current account restrictions). Exporters
that are forced to sell their foreign exchange earnings at the overvalued official
exchange rate pay an implicit tax. Conversely, importers that are allowed to buy
foreign exchange rate at the official exchange rate are granted an implicit subsidy.8
Table 2 shows the implicit tax rate applying to (legal) exports and the implicit
subsidy applying to (legal) imports for 1997–99. The indicative (equilibrium)
exchange rate is calculated as the weighted average of the three existing exchange
rates, using the market shares shown in Table 1. This is, of course, only a rough
approximation of the true market clearing rate, which would depend on factors
beyond the scope of this paper. However, the indicative exchange rate may suffice
to illustrate the magnitude of transfers and distortions involved.
Not surprisingly, implicit tax and subsidy rates applying to foreign trade oper-
ations more than doubled with the increase of the curb market premium that
started in the summer of 1998. Note, however, that the implicit tax rate on non-
centralized exports is much lower than that on centralized exports both because the
more depreciated commercial bank exchange rate applies and only a part of
foreign exchange receipts needs to be surrendered.
The size of the quasi-fiscal transfer between exporters and importers can be
calculated by comparing the domestic currency equivalent of foreign exchange
flows based on actually applied exchange rates with those based on the market
clearing rate. Table 3 shows that producers of centralized exports are the main
losers, paying an implicit tax to the tune of 12 percent of GDP in 1999, while the
recipients of foreign exchange through official channels gained about 15 percent
of GDP. Both the implicit tax and subsidy burden have increased over the last three
years, despite the fact that the U.S. dollar value of foreign trade declined. In 1997,
the subsidy for imports was higher than the tax on exports because the CBU drew
down net reserves. After the changes to the foreign exchange regime in July 1998,
the CBU moved from being a net loser to becoming a net gainer, which explains
why for 1998 as a whole implicit taxes exceeded implicit subsidies. This trend
continued in 1999, especially after the CBU substantially reduced its foreign
exchange sales in the second half of the year (see Box 1).
Note that in addition to the transfer from legal exports to legal imports exam-
ined here, there is an equivalent implicit subsidization of illegal exports and
implicit taxation of illegal imports, which benefit (suffer) from the overly depre-
ciated curb market exchange rate. The size of this transfer cannot be quantified
since the size of these illegal transactions is unknown. It can be assumed, however,
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8For a numerical example illustrating the functioning of Uzbekistan’s quasi-fiscal regime see
Rosenberg and De Zeeuw (2000, p. 10).that this set of quasi-fiscal transfers has increased with the widening of the
exchange rate premium and the rise of the shadow economy.
Quasi-fiscal operations through the foreign exchange regime not only redis-
tribute resources between sectors. As is the case with any government intervention
that distorts relative prices, they also cause efficiency losses. In practice, these are
manifested in many different ways: resources are diverted from sectors where
Uzbekistan is likely to have a comparative advantage (for example, food and food
processing) to large loss-making investments (such as the automobile industry);
entrepreneurs spend more time thinking about how to circumvent cumbersome
foreign exchange restrictions than how to improve their businesses; those compa-
nies who obtain import permissions sell their product at home or abroad at curb-
market equivalent prices, reaping large profit margins; and barter trade increases
since foreign exchange is unavailable.
In principle, the welfare effects of Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime are
the same as an equivalent explicit system of taxes and subsidies. For example, the
government could levy an export tax equivalent to the difference between the offi-
cial exchange rate and the hypothetical market clearing rate on centralized exports.
Nevertheless, direct government interventions, such as price regulations,
combined with outright rationing cause larger microeconomic distortions than
interventions such as explicit taxes. The size of these excess burdens of multiple
exchange rate practices is the subject of Section III. 
The equivalence of explicit and implicit government intervention also applies
to the welfare-theoretical argument that the government is unlikely to be suffi-
ciently informed about consumers’preferences and investors’profits to make deci-
Christoph B.Rosenberg and Maarten de Zeeuw
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Table 2. Uzbekistan: Implicit Tax 
and Subsidy Rates on Foreign Trade, 1997–99
(In percent, unless otherwise indicated)
1997 1998 1999
Implicit tax rates
Centralized exports 26 37 56
Other exports 5 9 21
Implicit subsidy rates
Centralized imports 26 37 56
Other imports 17 30 43
Memorandum items:
Surrender requirement on non-centralized exports 30 30 50
Official exchange rate (sum/U.S. dollar, average) 67 95 125
Commercial banks’ exchange rate (sum/U.S. dollar, average) 75 105 163
Curb market exchange rate (sum/U.S. dollar, average) 150 270 540
Indicative exchange rate (sum/U.S. dollar, average) 90 151 285
Sources: CBU; and authors’own calculations.sions on the Pareto-optimal ranking of imports. Nevertheless, the Uzbek authori-
ties do not justify their market interventions by the existence of negative market
externalities, but rather insist that the government knows better than the private
sector what imports benefit the country, especially in the long term.9
Before turning to the exact nature and size of the welfare losses associated
with Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime, let us review the reasons why an
explicit fiscal regime would be preferable to the implicit system practiced now.
First, the present system suffers from a lack of transparency. Because of the
hidden nature of quasi-fiscal operations, policy makers as well as voters have no
clear picture of the existence of the tax or subsidy, its size, and the extent to which
it was intended by the government. There is little accountability, putting the
system at odds with a main principle of democratic administration. For example,
the rules determining eligibility for currency conversion are established without a
mandate by parliament. In a sense, implicit taxation is similar to tax evasion where
the taxpayer does not report that he should pay tax—implicit taxation means that
the government does not report that it is taxing.
Secondly, quasi-fiscal operations through the foreign exchange regime
confine the government’s flexibility when conducting fiscal policies. While
revenues from explicit taxation can be saved or spent on the provision of public
and merit goods, which are recognized to be a welfare-neutral form of public
expenditure, implicit tax “revenues” from Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime
cannot be used for anything but the subsidization of certain industries. Thus, the
system automatically generates distortions both on the revenue and expenditure
side. The size of implicit subsidies, moreover, is determined arbitrarily by the
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Table 3. Uzbekistan: Implicit Taxes and Subsidies 
on Foreign Trade, 1997–99
(In percent of GDP)
1997 1998 1999
Foreign exchange inflows 6.0 10.7 16.2
Centralized exports 5.2 8.1 11.8
Cotton 3.4 5.4 6.7
Gold 1.8 2.7 5.2
Other exports 0.9 2.6 4.4
Foreign exchange outflows 8.5 10.4 15.1
Centralized imports 7.0 6.3 7.1
Other imports 1.5 4.1 8.0
Sources: CBU; and authors’own calculations.
9See, for example, the following quote from an Uzbek government publication: “There is also great
demand for foreign currency from shuttle traders importing consumer goods of unknown firms, without
quality certificates. This cannot be considered sound from an economic point of view. Currency regula-
tions, including restrictions on convertibility, prevent the influx of such goods” (Chepel, 1998).amount of implicit tax revenues that are funding them. An explicit import
subsidy combined with a free market for foreign exchange would not have these
drawbacks.
Third, multiple exchange rate practices entail a considerable administrative
burden. Issuing foreign exchange licenses and quotas is not only a costly and inef-
ficient use of the government’s administrative resources, it also invites corruption
and rent-seeking behavior.10 This is particularly the case if, as seen in Uzbekistan,
many different agencies and officials are involved in the approval process. One of
the macroeconomic implications is that such a cumbersome and corruption-prone
system discourages foreign direct investment and exports, thus putting further
pressure on the balance of payments.
Finally, multiple exchange rate practices introduce an element of uncertainty
regarding the availability of foreign exchange. This encourages dollarization11
with all its associated problems for the sustainability of the banking system and
monetary policy (see Baliño, Bennett, and Borensztein, 1999). More generally, it
impedes planning by economic agents and implicitly imposes a risk premium to
doing business in Uzbekistan.
III. The Welfare Costs of Multiple Exchange Rates
In this section we attempt to identify and quantify some of the welfare losses asso-
ciated with Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime. As shown in Section II, there
is no difference from the welfare analytical point of view between the effects of
explicit and implicit taxes and subsidies. We can, therefore, use standard trade
theory when analyzing the welfare costs associated with the quasi-fiscal opera-
tions, which is the subject of this paper. For simplicity, we abstract from other
distortions in these markets, such as state procurement at below-market prices and
government subsidies for inputs.12 We also omit an analysis of the welfare effects
arising from the implicit subsidization of illegal exports and implicit taxation of
illegal imports mentioned above. A formal variant of the model (described in the
appendix) allows us to calculate the actual size of the net welfare losses involved,
depending on some rough parameterizations.
Theoretical Considerations
The welfare effects of taxes and subsidies are typically examined in a static partial
equilibrium model of an open economy using the concept of consumer and
producer surpluses, the so-called Harberger triangles. A graphical exposition can
be found in any standard textbook on foreign trade. For an application to the case
of Uzbekistan’s quasi-fiscal foreign exchange operations, see Rosenberg, Ruocco,
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10As a result, Uzbekistan’s consistently ranks low in international comparisons of transparent busi-
ness practices, such as the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International.
11Demonetization in Uzbekistan is evidenced by the decline of the ratio of broad money to GDP from
about 14 percent in 1996 to less than 10 percent in 1999.
12These are partly analyzed in Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard (1999). and Wiegard (1999). A similar analysis for Poland in the late 1980s was conducted
by Tarr (1990).
First, consider the welfare effects on the exports side. If Uzbekistan is
modeled as a small open economy (that is, it is a price taker for all of its
exports), it faces a horizontal excess demand curve from the rest of the world.
By imposing an implicit export tax (equivalent to the difference between world
market prices at the official and the market clearing exchange rate), the govern-
ment gains some implicit revenue in the form of cheap foreign exchange. On the
other hand, the implicit export tax causes economic distortions and leads to a
decrease of the producer surplus. In the small country case, the latter unam-
biguously outweighs the increase in consumer surplus and the country (on
balance) loses economic welfare.
This may change if Uzbekistan is modeled as a sufficiently large exporter, for
example, of cotton fiber. In this case, the country faces an upward sloping rather
than horizontal excess world demand function. By imposing an implicit export tax
and hence curtailing its own supply of cotton to world markets, Uzbekistan could
tilt the terms of trade of cotton in its own favor and gain welfare at the expense of
the rest of the world. In theory, the authorities could set an “optimal” exchange
rate differential (equivalent to an optimal export tax) where the welfare gain and
the implicit tax revenue outweigh the domestic distortions. The exact result will
depend on the elasticities of demand and supply. When setting such an optimal
export tax, the authorities may also want to take into account possible retaliations
from trading partners as well as the size of the welfare cost imposed on the rest of
the world. The latter may be of particular importance if Uzbekistan desires admis-
sion to the World Trade Organization.
Does Uzbekistan indeed have some monopolistic power on world cotton
markets that would allow it to affect the international terms of trade in its favor?
In the 1997–98 harvest season, Uzbekistan had a share in world exports of
cotton fiber of about 15 percent (second after the United States) and a share in
world production of about 6 percent, suggesting that it may indeed have some
leverage to drive up world market prices by keeping its crop in stock. In prac-
tice, however, the country is very much dependent on the foreign exchange
earned from its cotton crop and has therefore shown no signs that it is deliber-
ately curtailing its supply. On the contrary, the authorities have made the
increase of cotton yields one of their main priorities. Finally, the empirical
evidence of the last few years does not seem to support a role for Uzbekistan as
a price maker: while cotton production in Uzbekistan has steadily fallen, so have
world cotton prices. We can therefore safely ignore the case of Uzbekistan as a
large country.
Now consider the implicit subsidy granted to those importers who have access
to foreign exchange at the preferential exchange rates. Again, Uzbekistan loses
welfare if modeled as a small, price taking country for imports. In the unlikely
event that Uzbekistan can be considered a “large country” (maybe for the import
of specialized capital goods, such as cotton harvesting machines), the standard
model leads to the conclusion that it unequivocally loses net welfare. This is
because the improvement of the terms of trade for imported machinery is more
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country wanted to use its market power, it should tax, not subsidize, certain capital
goods imports. 
Quantitative Analysis
The net welfare effects of implicit taxation and subsidization can be quantified by
using a standard partial equilibrium model. For simplicity, consider the more real-
istic case of Uzbekistan as a small open economy, both for exports and imports.
We assume a constant elasticity export supply function.
(1)
with PX the export price (measured in foreign currency units) and X the exported
quantity and the export elasticity defined as
(2)
After a number of manipulations, which are shown in the appendix, the net welfare
losses can be expressed as a function of implicit tax revenues and elasticities.
Unfortunately, no estimates of the latter exist for Uzbekistan or a similar transition
country. Recent research by Reinhart (1995) and Senhadji and Montenegro (1999)
suggest that long-run export elasticities in resource-rich developing countries are
around or below unity, while they tend to be higher for industrial countries. Tarr
(1990) uses a long-run elasticity of 1.16 in his study of pre-liberalization Poland.
In the absence of a firm estimate, we examine a range of elasticities between 0.5
and 1.5.
Table 4 shows the net welfare losses in 1997–1999 as a percent of GDP for
these alternative export supply elasticities. Overall, welfare losses increase with
export elasticities, which is in line with the Ramsey rule. Most importantly, our
calculations show that welfare losses have increased more than proportionally
during the past three years.13As the difference between the administered exchange
rates and the true market clearing exchange rate has widened, Uzbekistan’s foreign
trade has become increasingly distorted and inefficient. This is, inter alia, reflected
in the decline of foreign trade and the low quality of government-subsidized
investments (“white elephants”).
The sensitivity analysis shows that for a plausible range of parameter values
the welfare loss for centralized exporters is much larger than for other exporters
facing a lower implicit tax burden. This is the case even if we assume that for
centralized exports (mainly cotton and gold) the elasticity is less than unity, which
ε β XP X
X dX
d X == ⋅
P
P 1
PB X X => β β        0
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13This confirms a standard result in the theory of taxation. See for example Connolly and Munro
(1999, pp. 196–202).seems more likely, certainly in the short term.14 The results highlight the need to
address the overvaluation of the official exchange rate and the 100 percent
surrender requirement for cotton and gold producers. Unifying only the curb
market exchange rate with the commercial banks’exchange rate, as the authorities
did on May 1, 2000 does little to reduce the efficiency losses entailed by
Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime.
The calculation of the welfare effects of subsidizing imports is analogous to
the export side. Table 5 shows the results, again for a range of plausible parameter
values.15 As on the export side, the net welfare loss increased more than propor-
tionally as the implicit subsidy rates more than doubled over the past three years.
While in 1997 the total welfare loss due to these subsidies was less than 2 percent
of GDP, it was in the range of 2 to 8 percent of GDP in 1999.
Note that in general one cannot simply add up the excess burdens from Table
4 and Table 5, not even if expressed in monetary terms. The reason is that the two
distortions partly overlap each other, for instance when the subsidization of
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14One may argue that the short-term supply elasticity of cotton is close to zero since inputs provided
under the government procurement system are fixed and state orders aim at maximizing production irre-
spective of world prices. In practice, however, farmers have resorted to illegal exports in order to avoid
the implicit taxation through the overvalued exchange rate. Therefore, their surrenders of cotton to the
government for legal exports (which are captured here) in effect depend on the producer price in foreign
currency terms.
15In the absence of elasticity data for Uzbekistan we again rely on recent estimates for developing
countries as benchmark. Reinhart (1995) calculated a mean import demand elasticity of –0.66 for a sample
of 11 developing countries in 1970–91, while Senhadji (1998) found a mean elasticity of –1.24 from a
sample of 23 developing countries in 1960–93. In several developing countries their values are substan-
tially larger, which is why we also explore an import demand elasticity of –2.0. 
Table 4. Uzbekistan: Net Welfare Losses on Exports Markets, 1997–99
1997 1998 1999
Centralized exports Implicit tax rate (in percent)
26 37 56
Elasticity Net welfare loss (in percent of GDP)
0.5 0.42 1.09 3.22
1.0 0.88 2.34 7.47
1.5 1.42 3.88 13.49
Other exports Implicit tax rate (in percent)
59 2 1
Elasticity Net welfare loss (in percent of GDP)
0.5 0.01 0.06 0.29
1.0 0.02 0.13 0.59
1.5 0.04 0.20 0.94
Sources: CBU; and authors’own calculations.exporters partly compensates for the implicit tax imposed on them. Some other
caveats are in place when drawing conclusions from these calculations: the addi-
tional welfare effects from implicitly taxing and subsidizing illegal trade are
omitted; export and import markets are not independent from one another;
consumer and producer surpluses are of limited importance in the case of multiple
price changes; and results may change if Uzbekistan is modeled as a large open
economy, especially on the export market for cotton. Finally, the standard “second
best” argument holds.
IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper focuses on the welfare effects associated with the multiple exchange
rate practices in Uzbekistan.16 An analysis of the implicit tax on centralized
exports and the implicit subsidy on preferential imports shows that in 1999 there
was a (measurable) net transfer of about 16 percent of GDP from exporters to
importers. For plausible elasticity values, the efficiency loss caused by this quasi-
fiscal operation is between 2 and 8 percent of GDP for importers and up to 15
percent of GDP for exporters, but may be much larger if the distortions in the
growing illegal trade are included. The welfare loss is especially strong for central-
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Table 5. Uzbekistan: Net Welfare Losses on Imports Markets, 1997–99
1997 1998 1999
Centralized imports Implicit subsidy rate (in percent)
26 37 56
Elasticity Net welfare loss (in percent of GDP)
0.5 0.52 0.72 1.44
1.0 0.98 1.33 2.51
2.0 1.79 2.32 3.99
Other imports Implicit subsidy rate (in percent)
17 30 43
Elasticity Net welfare loss (in percent of GDP)
0.5 0.07 0.37 1.11
1.0 0.13 0.69 2.01
2.0 0.25 1.24 3.42
Sources: CBU; and authors’own calculations.
16In addition, Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime has implications for economic equity. The
implicit tax on centralized exports (mainly cotton) is regressive, as it levies a heavy burden on the poorest
part of the population, those working in agriculture. The same applies to the expenditure side: social assis-
tance through price regulation is not targeted to the poor, but extended to all consumers of certain
commodities, including the higher income groups. Moreover, rationing of scarce capital or foreign
exchange is usually associated with favoritism and outright discrimination.ized exports of cotton and gold, the sectors which are faced with the most unfa-
vorable exchange rates. With increasing implicit subsidy rates (measured by the
difference between the official and hypothetical market clearing rate), the welfare
loss on the import side is limited to the amount actually spent on imported goods.
With increasing implicit tax rates, the welfare loss on the export side increases
with the elasticity of export supply and is theoretically unlimited. Welfare losses
may be somewhat smaller if Uzbekistan has some monopolistic power on the
world cotton market.
Several policy conclusions arise from our analysis. First, Section II showed
that even if the welfare effects of explicit and implicit taxes and subsidies are the
same, there are several reasons why an explicit fiscal system would be preferable.
These include considerations of: (i) transparency, accountability, and associated
issues of governance; (ii) the government’s flexibility to conduct fiscal policy; (iii)
the administrative costs; and (iv) uncertainty.
Secondly, the analysis shows that welfare losses rise more than proportionally
with the implicit taxation or subsidization, approximated by the ratio of the curb
market exchange rate and the official exchange rate. Thus, the rise of the curb
market premium from 100 percent to more than 400 percent inflicts growing effi-
ciency losses on the Uzbek economy, severely undermining the country’s ability
to utilize its growth potential. From the economic policy point of view, our anal-
ysis at a minimum supports the conventional wisdom that the spread between
these various exchange rates needs to be reduced, if not eliminated, as soon as
possible.
Thirdly, the finding that excess burdens increase more than proportionally in
response to an increase in tax or subsidy rates supports even a gradual dismantling
of these distortions. If two distortions work in the same direction, the whole is
larger than the sum of the parts. That is, the excess burden of the two distortions
together is larger than the sum of the two excess burdens measured when each
distortion is considered separately. For reform, this means that if only one of
several cumulated distortions is removed, the beneficial effect on consumer or
producer welfare will be more than proportional. If a gradualist reform approach
would ever be effective, it would be in situations like these.
Finally, any reform of the existing foreign exchange regime will also need to
take account of the fact that distortions arising from explicit and implicit fiscal
operations often work in directions opposite to each other. Examples include:
• Uzbekistan, on the one hand, grants no value-added tax credit for the purchase
of capital goods, adding 20 percent to their price; on the other hand, there is
an implicit subsidy on imported capital goods of more than 50 percent (for
centralized imports) and 40 percent (for other legal imports).
• Until July 2000, imports of sugar and vegetable oil were subsidized through
the foreign exchange regime while at the same time both imports were
taxed by regressive “import excises” of 20 percent.
• As shown above, there is a large implicit tax on centralized exports of more
than 50 percent. At the same time, profits earned by exporting enterprises are
taxed at half of the standard rate of 33 percent. In addition, exporters enjoy
several other tax exemptions and implicit subsidies.
WELFARE EFFECTS OF UZBEKISTAN’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIME
175The consequences of reform in such situations are not clear a priori.
Removing the smallest distortion while leaving the biggest in place would exac-
erbate, not improve, welfare losses. Removing the biggest while leaving the
smallest in place would turn net taxation into net subsidization and vice versa,
with an increase in welfare costs if the smallest price distortion was larger than
half of the biggest. Therefore, it is essential for fiscal reform to identify distortions
that work in opposite directions (like the examples above) and to abolish them
simultaneously.17 Such reform packages would be superior to step-by-step reform
or the elimination of the multiple exchange rate regime alone.
We conclude that the Uzbek authorities should reduce, if not eliminate, the
above mentioned explicit and implicit distortions as soon and as simultaneously as
possible.
APPENDIX 
Calculation of the Net Welfare Loss Due to the Foreign 
Exchange Regime
The welfare loss (NWL) or excess burden due to Uzbekistan’s foreign exchange regime is
derived in Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard (1999). Here we replicate only the case of implicit
subsidies. Analogous manipulations apply for the case of implicit export taxes.
Let PMFT denote the fixed world market price and MFT be the import quantity that would
result under free trade (FT). By sub we denote the ad valorem subsidy rate and by PMsub = PMFT
(1 – sub) the subsidized price for Uzbekistan’s importers. Msub is the corresponding import
quantity under the subsidized exchange rate regime. Assuming a constant elasticity import
demand function and using the concept of Harberger triangles from their graphical analysis,
Rosenberg, Ruocco, and Wiegard (1999) show that for the small country case, the net welfare
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17The welfare effects of such tradeoffs were, for example, calculated by Tarr (1990) for Poland in the
late 1980s.Inserting (ii) and (iii) into (i), and factoring out results in
(iv)
If α = 1, the derivation is slightly different, but the outcome is basically the same. In this case
the primitive function of M–α is not M1–α /(1–α ) but ln(M), so that NWLM = sub P
M
FTMsub + A (ln
MFT – ln Msub), or, for that matter, sub P
M
FTMsub + A . ln(MFT /Msub).
If α = 1, A = (1 – sub) P
M
FT. Msub, so that NWLM = subP
M
FT Msub + A. ln (MFT/Msub) 
= subP
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= (using equation iv) subP
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FTMsub = {1 + (1 – sub) / sub}ln (1 – sub). 
The net welfare losses in Table 5 (and, analogously, in Table 4) are calculated inserting alter-
native elasticity estimates and the implicit subsidy rates from Table 2. Table A1 shows the
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Table A1. Uzbekistan: Annual Exchange Flows from Exports and Imports
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1997 1998 1999
Exports 2,756 2,882 2,251
Centralized 2,186 2,063 1,513
Other 570 819 738
Imports 3,926 2,872 2,251
Centralized 2,941 1,597 905
Other 985 1,275 1,346
Sources: CBU; and authors’own calculations.REFERENCES
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